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Globalization, Export-oriented Industrialization, 
Female Employment and Equity in East Asia* 
 
Introduction 
It is often claimed that the rapid growth in East Asia in recent decades has been due 
to export-oriented manufacturing growth, which is often attributed to open economic 
policies.  Hence, it is argued that economic globalization, which should accelerate 
international economic integration, will encourage export-oriented industrialization 
and related manufacturing employment.  Such processes are also expected to 
enhance womens position within the economy.  The assumption behind this last 
assertion seems to be that with export growth (which is supposed to be facilitated by 
trade liberalization) the demand for female labour increases faster than for male 
labour, so that female wages also rise faster than male wages, and eventually 
converge. These trends are presumed to eliminate labour market rigidities and 
remove the institutional foundations for gender-based discrimination in labour 
markets. Thus, globalization is supposed to improve the condition of women by 
creating manufacturing employment opportunities for them while eliminating gender 
discrimination in labour markets. 
 
This paper challenges this picture at several levels. After critically reviewing 
economic dimensions of globalization in part 1, the paper goes on to argue in part 2 
that East Asian industrialization has been decisively advanced by appropriate 
government interventions. It will show that selective interventions, or industrial policy, 
have been crucial, especially for the greater Northeast Asian successes in 
developing indigenous industrial capacities and capabilities.  Protection conditional 
on export promotion has enabled import-substituting infant industries to become 
internationally competitive export-oriented industries. Part 2 also looks more closely 
at industrial employment in the region by gender. Gender discrimination in the 
regions labour markets seems to have survived economic liberalization, with the 
large gender wage gaps characteristic of the region not closing despite rapid growth 
and full employment.  The final part of the paper (Part 3) argues that the changing 
international economic governance associated with the current phase of globalization 
is likely to constrain further late industrialization efforts and limit the economic 
welfare gains associated with the rapid growth of manufacturing employment in the 
East Asian region in the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
1. Globalization 
Globalization often refers to the accelerated increase in international economic 
relations in the recent period, usually associated with greater economic liberalization, 
both internationally as well as within national economies, that has taken place since 
the early 1980s. Though it is moot whether liberalization at the international level 
should be equated with globalization (Thompson and Hirst 1996), for the purposes of 
the present paper we do not distinguish between the two. Hence, the international 
dimensions of liberalizationor external liberalizationare associated with 
globalization. 
 
                                                
* I am most appreciative of Shahra Razavi's patient editorial encouragement and help, going 
well beyond the usual responsibilities of a volume editor, as well as of Cristina Paciello's 
assistance in preparing the tables on female manufacturing employment. Needless to say, I 
am otherwise solely responsible for this paper. 
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Liberalization, economic and otherwise, has been quite uneven, with global economic 
liberalization even more so. However, it would be a mistake to think of liberalization 
as deregulation. Instead, it can be shown that liberalization actually involves new 
regulations or re-regulation conducive to liberalization, i.e. an effectively liberalized 
regime requires regulation, albeit of a very different nature, as opposed to the 
complete absence of regulation, which would give rise to anarchy. 
 
There is a widespread sense of globalization emanating from, and being largely 
determined by, the centres of world capital, advanced technology and, it is often 
presumed, human civilization. In a sense then, globalization is seen as the latest, 
accelerated andvery importantlymost intensely transnationalized stage of the 
process identified with development and modernization with which earlier 
generations have been concerned. The information revolution as well as the reduced 
costs, greater ease and consequent intensification of communications, including 
transportation, are generally believed to have facilitated and furthered these 
processes. 
 
Those favouring globalization have often been ideologically inspired by liberal, neo-
liberal, market and other pro-business ideologies. In this sense, globalization is not 
simply an analytical concept, but also expresses particular views of what is 
considered inevitable or desirable. For many such proponents, globalization refers 
primarily to the extension and deepening of global markets. It is further maintained 
that national governments have consequently lost much of their power, with this often 
seen as desirable for enhancing economic efficiency and even human welfare. 
 
The contemporary globalization experience is not only seen by many as being 
without precedent, but also as natural and desirable. In fact, the process of 
international economic integration from the last third of the nineteenth century until 
the outbreak of the First World War, surpassed many of the contemporary indices of 
globalization, albeit perhaps not at the same pace. Interestingly, globalization from 
the late nineteenth century involved far more trans-border labour flows and greater 
human migration than currently allowed by most national governments. This is not to 
suggest that there is nothing new about contemporary globalization; such an attitude 
would only blind us to the significance of the monumental changes currently taking 
place. 
 
The crucial role of technological change in contemporary globalization cannot be 
overemphasized, and the full potential and implications of recent, current and future 
technological developments can hardly be fully anticipated. Yet, while there 
undoubtedly are many aspects of the current globalization that have been made 
possible by recent technological developments, particularly in communications, 
transport and information technology, many of these aspects of contemporary 
globalization are certainly not inevitable consequences of such technical changes. 
They are more often due to the historical circumstances of the economic, social and 
political control and deployment of such technology. 
 
Hence, globalization and its implications have been quite complex, often uneven, 
even contradictory, and certainly not unambiguously desirable in their totality. While 
opening up new possibilities and opportunities, it has also closed off many others. At 
the very moment when so much more is possible due to technological progress, so 
much more is also denied by the simultaneously growing ownership and control of 
new technology, with the strengthening of intellectual property rights and the means 
for their enforcement. 
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Globalization since the 1980s has often been associated with the emergence of a 
new transnational regime characterized by weaker national, including state, 
sovereignty as well as local, including community, autonomy. In retrospect, it appears 
that the debt crises of the early 1980s, induced by United States-led deflationary 
policies, provided a critical opportunity for Washington to try to impose a succession 
of new international economic policy regimes through the Bretton Woods institutions 
and, more recently, through the World Trade Organization (WTO). While the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed short-term macroeconomic stabilization 
policies forcing indebted governments to open up their national economies to imports 
and capital from the North, the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, or IBRD) followed through with complementary medium-term 
policies for structural adjustment. 
 
Much of the recent neo-liberal economic literature suggests that economic 
nationalism and government intervention have undermined market forces and 
property rights, with adverse implications for economic growth, welfare, equity and 
efficiency, particularly in terms of resource allocation.  Economic liberalization, 
including globalization, it is argued, will undermine all this, with generally benevolent 
consequences on balance. The collapse of the Soviet bloc, the crises of the 
European welfare states, and the development failure of much of the South are 
invoked as evidence of the failure of Keynesianism, dirigisme, economic nationalism, 
socialism and other developmental projects involving state intervention. 
 
Yet, the policies associated with the Washington Consensus have had mixed 
consequences, and have usually not proven to be the panaceas they were touted to 
be. It is often assumed that globalization has helped spur economic growth 
throughout the world.  According to Weisbrot, Naiman, and Kim (2000), the official 
data for the last two decades (1980-2000) suggest a different record: economic 
growth has slowed dramatically, especially in the less developed countries, as 
compared with the previous two decades (1960-1980).  Hence, the World Bank and 
IMF cannot point to any region in the world as having succeeded by adopting the 
policies that they promoteor, in many cases, imposein borrowing countries. 
Understandably, they are reluctant to claim credit for China, which maintains a non-
convertible currency, state control over its banking system, and other major violations 
of IMF/World Bank prescriptions. 
 
Nevertheless, there has been a clearly discernible trend toward global economic 
liberalization, which has involved liberalization of the international trade in goods and 
services on the one hand, and the flows of international capital (foreign direct 
investment, portfolio equity investment, borrowings, etc.) on the other, though the two 
are often closely related. But recent globalization has also involved new, often 
standardized, regulation, ostensibly to level playing fields. This has been the main 
thrust of new international trade and investment regulations. 
 
Stronger regulations, implementation and enforcement have strengthened intellectual 
property rightsaffecting technology transfers and technological developmentand 
further constrained international migration. Changes in transnational economic 
governance since the 1980s have largely been along lines acceptable toand 
promoted bythe Washington Consensus. They have been greatly enhanced by 
the establishment of the WTO with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 1993. Greatly 
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strengthened intellectual property rights of the last decade have raised the costs of 
technology acquisition, thus further frustrating late industrialization efforts. 
 
Uneven resistance by various national governments and othersespecially in the 
face of the protracted global economic slowdown since the end of the post-war 
Keynesian Golden Ageas well as increasingly intense rivalries among the United 
States, the European Union (EU) and Japan, have rendered these processes uneven 
and their consequences quite mixed. Perhaps most importantly, the actual 
consequences of global liberalization have been much more adverse than they were 
widely expected to be, thus undermining the case for further liberalization (e.g. see 
Jomo and Nagaraj 2001). However, despite the inevitable hesitancy this record has 
brought about, in contrast to the often arrogant and over-confident predictions and 
promises of the 1980s, the liberalizing juggernaut lumbers on, with a momentum 
sustained by the apparent absence of viable alternatives, as the new ideological 
hegemony defines the terms and scope of permissible discourse and debate 
(Krugman 1995). 
 
2. East Asia: Industrialization, State Intervention and 
Employment 
The sustained rapid growth and successful late industrialization of East Asia, 
associated with industrial policy, have posed awkward challenges for the neo-liberal 
orthodoxy.  Since the mid-1990s, the literature acknowledging the importance of 
good governance has grown, re-legitimizing the role of state intervention. Meanwhile, 
even the World Bank (1993) has acknowledged the significant contribution of 
directed credit in financing late industrialization in some of the eight high-
performing Asian economies (HPAEs) of East Asia, though it claims that there is no 
evidence of successful selective industrial policy associated with trade interventions. 
Instead, it argues that the second-generation Southeast Asian newly industrializing 
countries (NICs), notably Malaysia and Indonesia, performed best after abandoning 
industrial policy intervention in the mid-1980s. Although the evidence is hardly 
conclusive (Jomo et al., 1997), the Bank goes on to suggest that the second-
generation Southeast Asian NICs are therefore the more appropriate models for 
emulation for the rest of the developing worldcompared to the first-generation East 
Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan Province of 
China (hereafter Taiwan), Singapore and Hong Kong. Ironically, in the aftermath of 
the currency meltdowns and financial crises in Southeast Asia since mid-1997, 
pundits are arguing precisely the opposite, i.e., that Southeast Asias recent 
problems have been due to emulating Japan and South Korea, and not liberalizing 
enough. 
 
2.1. Late Industrialization in East Asia 
In the early 1960s, Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) argued that late industrializers 
were likely to evolve different institutional forms in order to exploit their lateness and 
to catch up.  More specifically, according to Gerschenkron, the larger capital 
requirements of industrialization over time require new institutional arrangements 
whereby the state takes on a larger and more active role in the industrialization effort 
of the late-comers compared to the pioneer industrializers (e.g. Britain).1 
                                                
1 It is not very clear if government intervention in pioneer countries was as minimal as 
Gershenkron suggests (Kozul-Wright, 1995). It is also unlikely that government intervention 
will increase ad infinitum in sequentially later industrializations if an alternative actor to 
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Late industrialization in East Asia has taken place in specific historical and 
geopolitical circumstances, and has its own peculiarities. It nevertheless offers many 
important lessons for developing countries.  The favourable economic conditions in 
the post-World War Two era and during the Cold War are believed to have been 
crucial for the late industrialization of the first-tier East Asian newly industrialized 
economies (NIEs), including South Korea and Taiwan. Buoyant world demand during 
the first quarter century after the end of the war, and much more permissive 
international trading rules and enforcement provided a crucial window of opportunity, 
which Japan and the first-tier East Asian NIEs successfully took advantage of to 
develop internationally competitive manufacturing capabilities from temporarily 
protected import-substituting industries. 
 
The later emergence of the second-tier Southeast Asian NICs (Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia) suggests that there continued to be space for late industrialization 
initiatives. Although world economic growth has been slower since the 1970s, and 
especially from the 1980s, less favourable international conditions did not block late 
industrialization efforts of these countries. International trends were probably more 
contradictory and ambiguous than they were often made out to be, and many 
opportunities for late industrialization still exist within the interstices of the new, more 
globalized and liberalized economic environment. 
 
After the Southeast Asian recessions of the mid-1980s, strong and remarkably 
sustained recoveries were initially buoyed by improved primary commodity prices 
and, most importantly, by foreign investments from Japan and the first-tier East Asian 
NIEs, encouraged by relaxed investment regulations and the marked currency 
depreciations of the second-tier Southeast Asian NICs. Thus, more conducive and 
permissive policies successfully attracted foreign investmentsespecially in export-
oriented manufacturingwhich helped begin and then sustain economic recovery 
from the late 1980s. 
 
The recent resurgence of protectionism and conditional liberalization in the North 
have certainly meant less favourable circumstances, as suggested by recent 
developments in international trade and related policies and practices by the 
advanced industrial economies. The mid-1990s extension of GATT jurisdiction to 
foreign investments, the international trade in services and intellectual property 
rights, as well as the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), will 
probably also strengthen transnational corporate hegemony and impose additional 
obstacles and costs to new late industrialization efforts, as discussed in section 3 of 
this paper. In addition, the more recent export-led growth of large economies, 
including China, India and a host of other economies, must surely constrain the 
options for others seeking to grow and industrialize on a similar basis. 
 
Industrial Policy and the East Asian Divide 
It is true that all High-Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs) have experienced 
unprecedented growth and structural transformation in the last few decades (see 
Jomo 2000: Table 1). However, while the East Asian economies all achieved export-
oriented industrialization, they did so under different circumstances. Japan and 
                                                                                                                                       
promote industrialization presents itself (Amsden, 2001). Taking on board Gershenkrons 
original insight that the chronological order of industrialization matters, Amsden restates 
Gershenkrons aphorism thus: the later a country industrializes in chronological history, the 
greater the probability that its major manufacturing firms will be foreign-owned (2001:286). 
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others in the Northeast Asian region have hardly pursued open economy policies. In 
fact, the Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese governments supported import 
substituting industrialization policies from the fifties, and then went on to encourage 
an export oriented approach as well, in order to ensure that their industries quickly 
became internationally competitive. 
 
More importantly, in many cases, infant industries were provided with effective 
protection conditional on export promotion, which had the effect of forcing the firms 
and industries concerned to quickly become internationally competitive. By giving 
firms protection for certain periods, depending on the product being made, and by 
also requiring that they begin exporting certain shares of output within similarly 
specified periods, strict discipline was imposed on the firms in return for the 
temporary trade protection they enjoyed. Such policies forced firms to push down 
their own production costs as quickly as possible, e.g. by trying to achieve greater 
economies of scale and accelerating progress up learning curves. Requiring exports 
has also meant that producers had to achieve international quality standards quickly, 
which imposed pressures to progress technologically in terms of products as well as 
processes. With strict discipline imposed, but also some flexibility in enforcement, 
many of these firms managed to rapidly achieve international competitiveness. 
 
The strategy of temporary effective protection, conditional upon export promotion, 
can hardly be equated with trade liberalization. Recent criticisms (Baer, Miles and 
Moran 2000) of attempts by an earlier generation (e.g. Ian Little, Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Anne Krueger) to accommodate the Northeast Asian experience within their 
fundamentalist free trade advocacy paradigm, have exposed the intellectual sophistry 
of neo-classical trade economists in trying to explain away the Northeast Asian 
success in export promotion in conjunction with national market protection. 
 
The experiences of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, as well as Hong Kong and 
Singapore, more closely approximate the export-led model of growth envisioned by 
the World Bank. Compared to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, they were 
undoubtedly much more open to global markets, both in terms of trade and 
investment. And it is not surprising that Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia (the 
Southeast Asian three, or SEA3) are recommended by the World Bank as the most 
appropriate examples for other developing countries to emulate. 
 
Not only has Southeast Asia engaged in greater trade liberalization than Northeast 
Asia, but it has also depended far more on foreign direct investment (FDI). In the 
case of Singapore, for example, FDI has constituted about a quarter of gross 
domestic capital formation. In the case of Malaysia, the proportion has been about 15 
percent. At the other end of the spectrum, in Japan and South Korea, the percentage 
has long been below two percent. Some of the other countries fall between these two 
extremes, with very few near the mean for developing countries of around five 
percent. Those most successful in developing industrial capacities and capabilities in 
East Asianamely Japan, South Korea and Taiwanhave hardly depended on FDI, 
which has only played a relatively small role (Jomo et al. 1997). 
 
Yet, it is important to underline the role of industrial policy even in the more market-
friendly Southeast Asia.  Although often problematic, the role and contribution of 
industrial policy instruments in the development of the SEA3, especially in the last 
three decades, is undeniable (Jomo et al., 1997). Despite all the flaws and abuses 
involved, there is now little doubt that the structural transformation and 
industrialization of these economies have gone well beyond what would have been 
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achieved by exclusive reliance on international market forces and private sector 
initiatives. Insofar as deregulation and some other aspects of economic liberalization 
may weaken the incentive to further invest in the national economy, as happened in 
Indonesia even before the 1997-98 crisis, it may weaken capital accumulation within 
the national economy, as there is no guarantee that liberalization measures will 
consistently ensure greater net investment inflows. 
 
The SEA3s experiences with industrial policy offer several important lessons for 
other developing countries seeking to industrialize. Many such efforts may be 
constrained by the small initial size of domestic markets, the weaknesses of the 
national industrial entrepreneurial community, managerial expertise, technological 
capacity and international marketing networks, as well as domestic and external 
pressure to liberalize. Foreign investments and the temporary use of foreign human 
resources (e.g., consultants) have allowed SEA3 to compensate for their own 
resource inadequacies. While making efforts to attract foreign investment, host 
governments can also influence such investments to maximize gains for the national 
economy, particularly in the form of higher incomes and technology transfer.  The 
leverage of host governments can often be enhanced by the presence of more 
foreign investors from varied sources, both in diverse as well as competitive 
activities. 
 
The point to emphasize is that even in the SEA3, export-oriented labour-intensive 
manufacturing by foreign investors did not and does not develop spontaneously with 
the availability of cheap labour, free trade and the absence of capital controls.  
Besides the provision of infrastructure and primary education, other supportive 
conditions (e.g. cultural and linguistic affinities, law and order) and policies (e.g. 
incentives including tax breaks and subsidies, education and training, investment and 
export promotion) have often been decisive in changing a countrys investment 
environment to attract desired foreign investments. 
 
In sum, industrial policy has been far more extensively deployed in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, than in the SEA3. The success of such industrial policy is 
reflected in the greater industrial and technological capabilities of the former 
compared to the latter.  It is also rarely recognized that Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan, selectively attracted some kinds of foreign investment and repelled others. 
Hence, FDI has accounted for a much more modest share of gross domestic capital 
formation (GDCF) in Northeast Asia than is the norm for developing countries, 
whereas FDI has been far more important in Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore 
and Malaysia, partly for political reasons. Yet, even in the Southeast Asian HPAEs, 
all with higher-than-average ratios of FDI to GDCF, there has been significant 
regulation of FDI (Felker and Jomo 1999). 
 
Regional Dynamics 
There is clearly an important pan-East Asian dimension to much of the recent 
economic growth in the region and the underlying relations involved.  Not 
surprisingly, much of this coincides with Japans wartime Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere and perceived post-war sphere of influence.  After the war, 
Japanese industrial recovery eventually led to the search for external markets in the 
region, and with post-war de-colonization, Japanese firms increased their market 
shares in the region by taking advantage of the former colonies import-substituting 
industrialization strategies, especially from the 1960s onwards. Subsequent 
relocation abroad by Japanese firms to reduce production costs was accelerated by 
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the strengthening yen. Thus, Japanese firms increasingly became part of the export-
oriented industrialization strategies of East, especially Southeast, Asia, particularly 
after the endaka (or yen appreciation) of the mid-1980s. The appreciation of the 
currencies of the other East Asian NIEs (except for Hong Kong, which has been tied 
to the US dollar since the early 1980s) since then has also encouraged the relocation 
of manufacturing facilities into lower-cost sites in Southeast Asia, China and 
elsewhere, resulting in an apparent regional economic integration with many novel 
features. Southeast Asian economies have thus been well placed to benefit from 
such investments, and government industrial policies have sought to co-ordinate 
such relocation. However, the flows of Taiwanese investments to South Africa and of 
Singaporean investments to Bangalore, India during this period suggest how 
politically-influenced such investment decisions have been and can be, and how 
other host governments can create the conditions to attract such investments. 
 
The recent proliferation of growth triangles in Southeast Asia suggests that such co-
ordinated industrial policy initiatives recognize and seek to gain advantage from 
economies of proximity and agglomeration as well as international divisions of labour 
in regional settings. Firms could then respond to new opportunities offered by 
regional agglomeration and perhaps new scale economies as well as national 
comparative advantages, by locating different processes in neighbouring countries. 
Such regional integration would also be attractive to firms anticipating regional 
economic co-operation, e.g., in the form of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA). Small countries can also gain by co-
ordinating their industrial policy efforts so as not to undermine one anothers efforts 
and not to reduce their leverage vis-à-vis investors. 
 
Regionalization is often identified as an aspect of globalization. While the 
strengthening of regional interactions undoubtedly represents a form of 
internationalization, which may well undermine national authority, it may also 
undermine globalization, in the sense that regional groupings often privilege 
interactions within the region at the expense of freer global interactions. For instance, 
regionalization may well be favoured by firms seeking to capture greater economies 
of scale than those offered by national markets, but which still wish to avoid full-
blown competition at the global level, to which they may well expect to succumb. For 
example, the 1992 agreement to form an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)which 
had been resisted by most Southeast Asian governments for a long timehas 
served to postpone greater trade liberalization with economies beyond the region, as 
well as enabling firms in the region to achieve greater scale economies for their 
import-substituting firms in regional markets in anticipation of inevitable trade 
liberalization. 
 
Export Oriented Industrialization: A Note 
As discussed above, successful export-oriented industrialization in East Asia did not 
occur spontaneously in open economies, but had to be inducedin various ways 
and to different degreesby pro-active government interventions.  It is therefore 
useful to distinguish between two paths to export-oriented industrial production. 
 
For most of the advanced industrial economies in the world as well as some newly 
industrialized economies, export production was necessitated by the limited size of 
domestic markets and the need to achieve economies of scale, so important in many 
branches of industrial production. Generally, such industrial production began for 
local and regional if not national markets, and progressedat different paces and in 
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various circumstancesto penetrate external markets. Not surprisingly then, there is 
an almost inverse relationship between the size of the domestic market and the 
share of exports in industrial output. 
 
However, in the case of late industrializing economies such as South Korea and, to a 
lesser extent, Taiwan, such a transition was deliberately accelerated by 
developmental state strategies, most notably providing temporary (effective) 
protection to emerging import-substituting industries and firms on condition that such 
firms promoted exports as quickly as possible, i.e. effective protection conditional on 
export promotion. Thus, import substituting (IS) and export-oriented (EO) 
industrialization strategies were linked to ensure that import-substituting infant 
industries quickly graduated into export production no longer dependent on 
protection and other state support. Requiring exports thus became a disciplinary 
mechanism to ensure that infant industry production quickly became cost-efficient as 
well as acceptable in terms of quality in competitive international markets. 
 
However, there has been another route to export-oriented industrialization (discussed 
in detail in some of the other contributions to this volume) that has been strongly 
promoted by the World Bank and other similarly oriented agencies since the 1960s. 
Not unlike the export-oriented enclaves of primary production reminiscent of the 
colonial period, similar enclaves called export-processing zones have been 
encouraged. Such enclavesoften known by various names such as free trade 
zoneshave allowed host governments to exempt these areas from the customs 
regulations affecting the rest of the national economy, which have often been 
developed to support import-substituting industrialization. Such zones also provide 
special infrastructure and other facilities to prospectiveusually foreigninvestors 
as well as the prospect of agglomeration economies and other advantages.  Not 
surprisingly, the very success of this strategy has resulted in an industrial dualism, 
with two manufacturing enclaves co-existing side by side in national economies, 
often with few linkages to each other as well as the rest of the national economies.  
Thus, while import-substituting industries often remain internationally uncompetitive, 
with their growth constrained by the size of the domestic market (or the regional 
market when regional customs unions or common markets have been established), 
the constraints on export-oriented industrial growth are rather different. 
 
2.2. The Employment Record in East Asia: 1980s and 1990s 
The United Nations (1999) has noted that female employment in the developing 
world has generally been increasing more rapidly than male employment and that 
export-oriented industries are more feminized. However, it also notes that since the 
late 1980s, in many middle-income countries the demand for women's labour in 
manufacturing has been weakening, as export production became more skill- and 
capital-intensive (United Nations 1999: 9), though it is not clear why de-feminization 
necessarily follows from greater skill or capital intensity. As examples of this trend, it 
cites Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. In South Korea specifically, it notes that 
the composition of the workforce in the electronics industry has changed in favour of 
male workers, as production in this sector shifted to more sophisticated 
communication and computer products, besides noting a similar trend with maquilas 
in Mexico. 
 
Table 1 shows the rising percentage of women in industrial/manufacturing 
employment over time in the early stages of labour-intensive industrialization, 
reflected in the rising proportion of the labour force in industry/manufacturing.  As the 
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East Asian NIEs achieved full employment, the tightening of the labour market 
triggered a rise in wages and other labour costs, and thereby encouraged greater 
structural change and shifts away from labour-intensive manufacturing employment 
which was predominantly female.  The decline in manufacturing employment set in 
for the first-tier or first-generation East Asian NIEs by the mid-1980s, encouraging 
them to relocate low-skill labour-intensive production to the rest of Southeast Asia 
and China from the late 1980s. Such relocation was encouraged by two other 
developments from the mid-1980s: first currency appreciations, and second, 
retaliatory actions from countries that were the targets of the highly successful export 
drive from this region. 
 
With the exception of the Hong Kong dollar that was pegged to the US dollar from 
1983, and the Southeast Asian currencies which were informally pegged to the US 
dollar2, the currencies of the other East Asian NIEs, most notably South Korea and 
Taiwan, appreciated with the yen against the US dollar after the endaka or yen 
appreciation that followed the G7 Plaza Hotel accord of September 1985.3  These 
currency appreciations had the effect of pushing the first wave of Northeast Asian 
direct investment into Southeast Asia (most notably Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia), while the low wages in Southeast Asia provided the pull factor that 
attracted the investments. 
 
The withdrawal of General System of Preferences (GSP) privileges under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)from the first tier East Asian 
NIEswas the second contributing factor that encouraged such relocation.4  The 
export success of the first tier NIEswhich entailed continuously increasing 
international market shareswas behind this retaliatory measure.  The ensuing 
Southeast Asian boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s achieved near full 
employment, especially in Malaysia and Thailand, attracted labour immigration, 
especially from neighbouring countries, and raised wages and other labour costs as 
in the first-tier NIEs earlier, resulting in similar relocations to Vietnam, China, India 
and elsewhere of foreign as well as domestically owned manufacturing capacities in 
the region. 
 
The Appendix Tables on womens employment in various industrial sub-sectors 
suggest that female labour shares have been highest in relatively low-skill, labour-
intensive and often export-oriented manufacturing. Appendix Tables 1a to 1f show 
manufacturing employment growing rapidly at different times in different economies, 
and then declining in the more industrialized economies. The tables also show the 
changing share of women in the manufacturing labour force. Appendix Tables 2a to 
2e show female wages as a share of male wages in the same economies during the 
1980s and 1990s except for Indonesia. Appendix Tables 3a to 3d show the 
percentage of women employed in various manufacturing sub-sectors and the share 
of the manufacturing workforce in the sub-sectors from the seventies. 
                                                
2 Unlike the official peg of the Hong Kong dollar to the US Dollar from 1983 through a 
currency board system, the Southeast Asian currencies were kept within a fairly narrow range 
against the US dollar through central bank efforts. The Indonesian rupiah devalued slightly 
every year while the Malaysian ringgit and Thai bath remained steady until July 1997. 
3 Through the Plaza Hotel accord of 1985 Japan was forced to appreciate its currency vis-à-
vis the US Dollar in order to reduce the Japanese trade surplus with the US. 
4 The GSP was introduced in GATT in 1970. It gave special concessions to developing 
countries in their export markets, and also gave them more freedom to protect certain sectors. 
The GSP agreements tended to be for ten years, but they have not been revised significantly 
since 1986 (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2001: fn.8). 
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In South Korea, manufacturings share of total employment rose from 6.3 per cent in 
1960 to 13.1 per cent in 1970, 21.5 per cent in 1980, reaching a peak of 27.8 per 
cent in 1989 before declining to 19.7 per cent in 1999. During this period, the female 
share of manufacturing workers rose from 26.6 per cent in 1960 to 32.9 per cent in 
1970, 39.0 per cent in 1980, 42.6 per cent in 1990 before declining to 35.3 per cent in 
1999. Female wages as a share of male wages in manufacturing rose from 45.1 per 
cent in 1980 to 55.3 per cent in 1999. 
 
In Hong Kong, manufacturings share of total employment rose from 39.5 per cent in 
1961 to 46.1 per cent in 1971, before declining to 42.1 per cent in 1980, 27.6 per 
cent in 1990 and 11.4 per cent in 1999. During this period, the female share of 
manufacturing workers rose from 32.8 per cent in 1961 to 41.7 per cent in 1971, 45.2 
per cent in 1980, and peaking at 48.4 per cent in 1982 and again 1984, before 
declining to 37.7 per cent in 1999. Female wages as a share of male wages in 
manufacturing rose from 77.7 per cent in 1982 to peak at 86.9 per cent in 1998. 
 
In Singapore, manufacturings share of total employment rose from 13.9 per cent in 
1957 to 19.7 per cent in 1970, 29.2 per cent in 1980, reaching a peak of 30.3 per 
cent in 1981 before declining to 20.9 per cent in 1999. During this period, the female 
share of manufacturing workers rose from 18.2 per cent in 1957 to 33.6 per cent in 
1970, 46.0 per cent in 1980, 47.2 per cent in 1987 before declining to 40.2 per cent in 
1999. Female wages as a share of male wages in manufacturing rose from 61.5 per 
cent in 1980 to 64.7 per cent in 1984 before declining to 59.3 per cent in 1999. 
 
In Malaysia, manufacturings share of total employment rose from 16.0 per cent in 
1980 to 19.9 per cent in 1990, reaching a peak of 23.3 per cent in 1993 and again in 
1997, before declining to 22.5 per cent in 1999. During this period, the female share 
of manufacturing workers rose from 38.2 per cent in 1980 to a peak of 47.6 per cent 
in 1990, before declining to 40.3 per cent in 1999. Female wages as a share of male 
wages in manufacturing rose from 47.5 per cent in 1983 to 62.9 per cent in 1999. 
 
In Thailand, manufacturings share of total employment rose from 3.4 per cent in 
1960 to 5.1 per cent in 1971, 7.9 per cent in 1980, 10.1 per cent in 1990 and 13.6 per 
cent in 1999. During this period, the female share of manufacturing workers rose 
from 37.6 per cent in 1960 to a peak of 50.4 per cent in 1991 before declining slightly 
to 49.3 per cent in 1999. Female wages as a share of male wages in manufacturing 
rose from 63.8 per cent in 1991 to 68.2 per cent in 1995. 
 
In Indonesia, manufacturings share of total employment rose from 5.3 per cent in 
1961 to 6.5 per cent in 1971, 9.0 per cent in 1980, 10.1 per cent in 1990, reaching a 
peak of 13.2 per cent in 1995 before declining to 11.3 per cent in 1998. During this 
period, the female share of manufacturing workers rose from 37.5 per cent in 1961 to 
42.6 per cent in 1971, and a peak of 47.8 per cent in 1982, before declining to 44.8 
per cent in 1997.  
 
While the manufacturing share of total employment has begun to decline in the three 
first generation East Asian newly industrialized economies of Hong Kong, Singapore 
and South Korea from 1971, 1981 and 1989 respectively, the same cannot be said of 
the three second-tier Southeast Asian newly industrializing countries of Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia, with the possible exception of Malaysia, which began 
absorbing more labour into manufacturing much earlier than the other two.  
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The female proportion of manufacturing workers peaked at different times in the 
different economies: 1982-84 in Hong Kong, 1989 in Singapore, 1990 in South Korea 
and Malaysia, 1991 in Thailand and thrice (1976, 1982 and 1993) in Indonesia. The 
recent declines in the female share of manufacturing labour in Thailand and 
Indonesia have been modest, compared to the sharper fall in Malaysia. While the 
sequence seems to follow that for the peaks in manufacturings share of total 
employment, there is no clear pattern in relation to the timing. 
 
Thailand has had a majority of women in the manufacturing labour force for the years 
1986 to 1994, i.e. the only years for which data are available. There was a brief 
female majority in Malaysia during 1990-92, while the female share in Indonesia 
exceeded 45 per cent during the mid-1990s. In South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia, textiles, wearing apparel, footwear, rubber products, electrical machinery, 
professional scientific equipment and other manufactures had a majority of women 
workers in at least some years, though only wearing apparel has consistently had 
(much) more women.  
 
In South Korea, there was also a female majority in some years in pottery, china and 
earthenware. In Thailand, this was also true for food products, tobacco, leather and 
leather products, other chemicals, plastic products, as well as pottery, china and 
earthenware. In Malaysia, this was the case for tobacco, leather and leather 
products, plastic products as well as pottery, china and earthenware. In Indonesia, 
tobacco, other chemicals, plastic products as well as pottery, china and earthenware 
were in the same category.  
 
Female wages as a share of male wages in 1999 were lowest in Korea (55.3 per cent 
from 45.1 per cent in 1980), followed by Singapore (59.3 per cent from 61.5 per cent 
in 1980!), Malaysia (62.9 per cent from 47.5 per cent in 1983), Thailand (68.2 per 
cent in 1995 from 63.8 per cent in 1991) and Hong Kong (84.1 per cent from 77.7 per 
cent in 1982). For the five economies with data, only Singapore saw a reversal of the 
closing of the gender wage gap from when it peaked at 64.7 per cent in 1984.  
 
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong had significantly less wages paid in 
their manufacturing sectors to women compared to men, but saw these gender wage 
gaps closing over time. Although the gender wage gap has been least in Hong Kong, 
it has continued to close over the last four decades, whereas the gender wage gaps 
seem to be largest in the other two first tier East Asian NIEs, namely South Korea 
and Singapore. Culture obviously cannot explain the great disparity among the three 
first generation East Asian NIEs, often dubbed Confucianist. 
 
However, there is little clear evidence that female employment shares have declined 
with the closing of gender wage gaps in manufacturing. Gender wage gaps have 
closed throughout the region except in Singapore, whereas female employment 
shares have declined in all the first-tier East Asian newly industrialized economies 
and may be beginning to decline in the second-tier Southeast Asian newly 
industrializing countries as well. 
 
The sub-sectors employing at least five per cent of the total manufacturing workforce 
in all four economies in at least one year include food products, textiles, wearing 
apparel, rubber products and electrical machinery. This was also true of rubber 
products in Malaysia. It is likely that food products were primarily for the domestic 
market, while varying portions of the other industrial products are probably also for 
domestic consumption, though they are more likely to be export-oriented. These 
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industries also seem to be characterized as primarily involving low-paying, low-skill, 
light manual work. It is not clear that export-oriented manufacturing per se has an 
especially strong connection with female employment. 
 
Although the precise mechanisms and relations are still poorly understood, there 
appears to have been a general regional pattern of increased female employment in 
manufacturing during the period of early rapid labour-intensive industrialization, 
probably accelerated by the availability of export markets. With full employment, 
more sophisticated or skill-intensive manufacturing and other related developments, 
manufacturing growth and industrial employment growth tapering off, with the female 
share of such employment declining, reflecting the gender preferences of the new 
industrial employers as the gender wage gap continued to close except in Singapore.  
 
Available data does not allow definitive claims regarding the role of export-oriented 
manufacturing as opposed to import-substituting industrialization, especially in the 
case of Northeast Asia where the two went hand in hand as effective protection of 
import-substituting industries was conditional upon, and thus required, export 
promotion of the same. As the Appendix Tables show and Ghosh notes elsewhere in 
this volume, the fall in womens share of manufacturing is not only true for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, but for export-oriented manufacturing as well. 
Joekes (1999) too notes that the share of women employed in export-processing 
zones declined between 1980 and 1990 in Malaysia, South Korea and the 
Philippines, with the sharpest decline from 75 per cent to 54 per cent in Malaysia.  
 
However, in so far as exports implied that the manufacturing growth rate was no 
longer circumscribed by the (expanding) size of the domestic marketas for import-
substituting industriesindustrialization probably accelerated with successful export-
oriented manufacturing, even if the industries concerned began with import-
substitution, as was important in South Korea, for example. And in so far as labour-
intensive, low-cost manufacturing for export has been the principal motive of 
industrial investments, such investments probably generated considerable direct 
employment5, presumably of women initially, if the jobs created were female-typed. 
 
Joekes (1995) argues that the swing back from female intensity in the Singaporean 
manufacturing as it has pursued its goal of product up-grading, may be attributed, as 
a proximate cause, to the fact that women workers with the needed technical 
qualifications were not available in sufficient numbers for recruitment to new technical 
and other skilled grades. However, it is not clear that this was necessarily a region-
wide phenomenon since the facilities for pre-employment industrial vocational 
training in the rest of the region have been less well developed6, though they are 
likely to be as gender-biased. As the data discussed above show, Singapore was 
                                                
5 Indirect employment effects were often limited in Southeast Asia where export-oriented 
industries have been dominated by foreign direct investors who have been more likely to be 
vertically integrated with international production chains or networks.  
6 While the gender gap in education is not large in East Asia compared to other regions, 
gender inequalities are evident at the tertiary level (sometimes due to deliberate government 
policies), and especially in terms of enrolment in courses and subjects with a strong technical 
content. Clearly, these economies public investments in human resources went well beyond 
the primary school limit recommended by the World Bank, with labour market interventions 
based on long-term considerations beyond current prices (Rodrik 1994). The expansion of 
education not only helped generate technical and professional human resources for industrial 
upgrading, but also enhanced opportunities for upward socio-economic mobility, including skill 
enhancement and higher remuneration (Deyo 1989). 
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exceptional among the Southeast Asian economies considered in being the only 
economy studied where the gender gap in manufacturing wages has actually 
widened in recent years.  
 
It is also quite likely that new industrial jobs have been male gender-typed adversely 
affecting female recruitment and promotion. Such gender typing is presumably also 
reinforced by gender-differentiated opportunities for on-the-job and other industrial 
training. In the absence of conclusive evidence, it is difficult to be certain as to why 
employers exhibited a preference for male workers. It may be due to the gender-
typing of jobs in the new, less labour-intensive industries, i.e. new jobs were simply 
deemed mens jobs. It also seems likely that the early phases of labour-intensive 
industrialization were more concerned with labour costs. Recruiting women probably 
enabled employers to save more on labour costs. As Ghosh notes elsewhere in this 
volume, women seemed less unwilling to accept poorer working conditions in terms 
of wages, non-unionization and more casualized employment terms.  
 
Also, as elsewhere, late industrialization often began with the garments and apparel 
as well as electrical and electronic industries. The historical role of textiles continued 
in the second half of the twentieth century in the developing countries thanks to the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Electrical and electronic manufacturing, testing and assembly have been 
relatively labour intensive and have grown exponentially in the region in the last third 
of the twentieth century.  
 
The socialization of girls at home and in vocational education deemed them 
especially suited to such work. Even if such claims are exaggerated, this became the 
ideology associated with the culture of such work and employment. It seems that as 
manufacturing production became more diversified and skill-intensive in the first tier 
or generation East Asian newly industrialized economies, the share of female 
manufacturing employment went down. 
 
While it is difficult to compare intra-household inequalities in income or consumption 
across countries due to the lack of robust and comparable data sets, the available 
evidence on gender wage gaps provides useful insights into gender inequalities.  
While there is no doubt that incomes and wages, including womens wages, rose 
spectacularly over short periods, the gender gap in wages, as well as the degree of 
occupational segregation in Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong remain large by 
international standards and show little sign of diminishing over time (Joekes, 1995: 
Tables 3 and 7). Data on female/male earnings in manufacturing for a number of 
developing countries in diverse regional settings shows the Northeast Asian 
countries, such as Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore to have some of the 
largest gender wage gaps on record, with little indication of amelioration over time 
(UN, 1999). 
 
Seguino (1997) argues that despite the high rate of growth of female employment in 
South Korea (which has been higher than the rate of growth of male employment), 
the gender wage gap has only marginally narrowed over the past twenty years 
contrary to what neo-classical economic arguments predict. The data she cites 
suggest that the average ratio of female to male earnings in Koreas manufacturing 
sector rose from 47.0 per cent in 1975 to 50.5 per cent in 1990, though the gap has 
continued to close in the decade since, as noted above. In the main female-
dominated export-oriented industriestextiles, apparel and electronicsthe 
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female/male earnings ratio has risen more, e.g. apparel, from 48.6 per cent in 1977 
to 58.4 per cent in 1990, whereas the gap has grown in male-dominated industries. 
 
According to Seguino (1997: 113-4), gender discrimination and differentiation in 
determining access to skill training provided by the state and by firms are part of the 
problem. She suggests that Korean chaebols have contributed to gender wage gaps 
since they dominate Korean manufacturing in both capital-intensive and labour-
intensive industries. Chaebols, she suggests, are especially reluctant to hire female 
labour in their capital-intensive industries because of patriarchal norms that reserve 
preferred jobs for males. According to Seguino, chaebols rely on profits and foreign 
exchange earnings from exports to fund investments and technology imports in 
capital-intensive industries. Limiting women's job opportunities by segregating them 
in the labour-intensive export industries ensures a cheap labour supply that promotes 
export sales and thus technology up-grading in other industries owned by the 
chaebol, and can lead to economic rewards from the state in return for meeting 
export targets. (Seguino 1997: 113). 
 
Seguino then tries to explain the more or less persistent gender-based wage 
differentials in Korean manufacturing. She rejects surplus female labour as an 
explanation for gender-based wage differentials. Comparing productivity and wage 
increases in different industries, she concludes that productivity gains have been 
more equitably shared with workers in male-dominated industries than in female-
dominated ones, where wages have lagged behind productivity gains. She argues 
that the failure of productivity gains in female-dominated industries to translate into 
commensurate wage gains cannot be explained by surplus female labour.  Instead, 
she suggests that the explanation lies in labour market institutions, the role of the 
state and the genderized division of labour in Korean corporate culture.  
 
Seguino (2000b) later noted that while the South Korean gender wage gap has been 
closing, the Taiwanese gap has been growing.  She explains this difference as due to 
recent restructuring, economic liberalization and different efforts to maintain export 
competitiveness, and notes that the gender wage gaps were most strongly 
associated with changes in intra-industry gender wage differentials rather than 
employment shifts. Besides labour market influences, she finds factors influencing 
womens relative bargaining power, particularly greater Taiwanese capital mobility 
(though partly offset by reduced female crowding in affected industries), to be 
important. Outward Korean FDI had the opposite effect as more capital intensive, 
male dominated industries were affected. She argues that greater state intervention 
in South Korea limited outward FDI, increased minimum wages (which raised female 
earnings more) and favoured more export-oriented firms, which tended to make more 
(quantitative and qualitative) productivity-raising investments as wage rates rose.   
 
Examining the determinants of economic growth in several newly industrializing 
economies where women constitute the bulk of the labour force in the export sector, 
Seguino (2000a) argues that gender wage inequality contributed to higher export-led 
growth during 1975-95. She found GDP growth in these economies positively related 
to the gender wage difference and found a positive link between gender wage 
inequality and growth via both channels [exports, and therefore technological change 
and productivity growth, as well as investment]. In particular, gender inequality 
stimulates investment, but also enhances the productivity of investment, possibly 
through the effect that low wages for women has on exports and therefore 
technology imports (Seguino 2000a: 1223). 
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Table 2. Malaysia: Manufacturing Labour Skill Composition By Gender, 1971-1997 
 
 
 
1971 1979 1985 1990 1997 
Females in total labour force (%) 32.1 46.7 46.1 52.4 45.5 
Female skilled in total skilled (%) 34.2 52.5 52.6 59.4 51.4 
Female unskilled in total unskilled 
(%) 
40.3 54.7 55.3 60.0 51.6 
Female skilled in female direct 
workers (%) 
42.7 57.1 65.4 66.2 60.2 
Male skilled in male direct 
workers (%) 
49.3 55.7 60.0 54.9 61.8 
Unskilled/skilled wage ratio 
 
0.62 0.71 0.61 0.60 0.60 
Skilled*/total direct workers (%) 46.8 54.5 58.6 54.6 61.0 
Direct workers/total  
(%) 
76.5 73.7 69.1 74.9 72.4 
Technical, professional and 
skilled in total labour force (%) 
51.6 59.3 67.0 61.6 68.1 
* includes semi-skilled workers 
Sources: Computed from Malaysia, Industrial Survey, 1971, 1979, 1985, 1990 and 1997.  
From Rasiah 2001: Table 11, p. 26. 
 
A review of manufacturing labour skill composition trends by gender in Malaysia is 
very suggestive. Table 2 suggests that the female share of the manufacturing labour 
force in Malaysia did not rise during the first half of the 1980swhen the government 
emphasized import-substituting heavy industrializationand then peaked in the early 
1990s before declining rather rapidly although the government continued to 
emphasize export-oriented manufacturing. The female share of skilled workers rose 
sharply in the 1970s, and then again in the late 1980s, before dropping sharply in the 
early and mid-1990s. The skilled workers share of all female direct workers also 
moved in parallel, though the female share of unskilled workers also moved likewise. 
Yet, although women comprised 59.4 per cent of all skilled workers and skilled 
workers comprised 66.2 per cent of direct women workers in 1990, compared to 40.6 
per cent and 54.9 per cent for male workers respectively, female workers in 
manufacturing earned only half of what males earned in that year.  
 
Except in 1979, when unskilled workers earned 71 per cent of what skilled workers 
earned, they averaged around 61 per cent in 1971, 1985, 1990 and 1997. The share 
of skilled workers among all direct workers rose steadily from 46.8 per cent in 1971 to 
61.0 per cent in 1997 except for a sudden dip to 54.6 per cent in 1990. Similarly, the 
share of technical, professional and skilled workers in the manufacturing labour force 
rose over the same period and dipped in 1990. These parallel trends probably reflect 
the sudden increase in industrial workers in the late 1980s with labour-intensive 
manufacturing investments from the first-tier East Asian newly industrialized 
economies such as Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. The decline in the share of 
direct workers in manufacturing despite the likely reduction of putting out work
mainly associated with garments manufacturesuggests a trend towards labour 
flexibility and casualization. This trend was probably accelerated by increased 
unemployment in the mid-1980s and briefly reversed with rapid manufacturing labour 
recruitment from the late 1980s. 
 
 19
Labour Market Liberalization 
While changing production relations at the international level have brought about 
some of this greater flexibility, much of it has been enforced by governments 
believing this to be desirable for attracting investments and thus enhancing growth. 
However, there has been relatively little resistance to such casualization, as its 
negative consequences were partly offset by the post-1985 boom (after the 
appreciation of the yen and the currencies of the first-tier East Asian NIEs), which 
has been accompanied by declining unemployment as well as improved labour 
remuneration to retain employees. However, such casualization negates the 
likelihood of corporatism, and hence of greater commitment by workers as 
stakeholders, as in Japan and Singapore. Weak institutional development governing 
labour relations has exacerbated the situation of workers in the region. Liberalization 
is also likely to have weakened the bargaining power of workers in Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia, and may thus have worsened income distribution.  
 
Liberalization did not significantly increase poverty in the region (except perhaps in 
Thailand) before the currency and then financial crises of 1997 induced a regional 
recession in 1998.  Until the crisis, growth continued to raise real incomes overall, 
and low unemployment and skill enhancement strengthened the bargaining power 
and remuneration of labour generally.  To varying extents, governments introduced 
some social safety nets to reduce the dislocation caused by rapid structural changes 
and cyclical influences. However, such provisions were minimized on the 
presumption that full employment could be indefinitely assuredproviding workfare 
and thus eliminating the need for welfare provisions.  It was often claimed that the 
unemployed could always count on traditional social safety nets provided by 
families, communities and informal sector participationmuch of it heavily reliant 
on unpaid and poorly paid female labour.  The social disasters due to the recessions 
following the 1997 East Asia financial crises have underscored the inadequacy of 
such provisions when they are most needed, and the disproportionate burden that is 
often thrown on the shoulders of poor women who have to intensify their labour force 
participation in low-paying female-dominated sectors, while maintaining their 
traditional responsibilities for daily household reproduction (Francisco and Sen, 
1999). 
2.3. Social Policy in East Asia? 
The history of social policy suggests that most social policy initiatives have been the 
result of social struggles, albeit in different political contexts.  In more democratic 
contexts, progressive social policies have tended to reflect the political ascendance 
of broad coalitions sympathetic to or supportive of the principal beneficiaries of such 
policies. Theda Skocpol (1992) has shown how the modest US welfare state 
provisions began in response to popular sympathy and support for mothers and 
military veterans.  Karl Polanyi (1944) has emphasized the significance of social 
policies and institutions of class compromise in ensuring the legitimacy of capitalist 
order in the aftermath of massive social dislocation.  Dani Rodrik (1998) suggests 
that such policies and institutions were necessary for public acceptance of the 
disruptive consequences of globalization. 
 
In more authoritarian contexts, social policies favouring previously politically 
disenfranchised groups may be considered to be the necessary or unavoidable costs 
of retaining regime legitimacy or acceptability, and of avoiding costly social conflicts. 
Hence, for example, reasonably equitable agrarian reforms were undertaken under 
US occupation in Japan and by anti-communist governments in South Korea and 
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Taiwan not dependent on landed interests7. Social policies and institutions were also 
deemed necessary to support corporatist arrangements in support of nationalist 
developmental state policies in many rapidly industrializing East Asian economies 
(Chang 2000). Significant agrarian reforms were undertaken at the beginning of the 
Cold War in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. More modest rural and labour reforms 
were undertaken in Malaysia and Singapore in the 1950s in the face of the only 
communist-led armed insurgency in the British Empire. State interventions have been 
especially extensive in Singapore (Rodan 1989) with social policy highly developed 
as a means of political control (Tremewan 1994). Even supposedly laissez faire Hong 
Kong has seen important interventions in the land, housing and education markets 
(Castells, Goh and Kwok 1990). 
 
This has been less true of the second-tier Southeast Asian newly industrializing 
countries of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.  There have been important social 
policy initiatives (rural development efforts and the state-sponsored Green Revolution 
in rice farming) to ensure regime legitimacy in Malaysia and Indonesia (Jomo et al. 
1997; Jomo 2002) and to reduce poverty as well as inter-ethnic economic disparities 
in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo 1999). However, significant initiatives for workers in 
export-oriented industries have been far more modest, if not non-existent. Most 
notably, retrenchment benefits for Malaysian workers were raised in response to the 
mid-eighties economic (especially electronics) downturn, only to be reversed after 
the 1997-98 economic crisis. Attempts to unionise and otherwise organize women 
workers have been subject to harassment, if not outright repression.  The high 
proportion of women in these industries labour force (especially in electronics, 
electrical, textiles, garments and apparel industries), the persistence of the ideology 
of women as secondary income earners and the disproportionately modest role of 
women in the weak organized labour movements (Jomo and Todd 1994) have only 
exacerbated this problem. 
 
3. The New International Economic Governance and 
Late Industrialization 
Recent developments in international economic governance increasingly constrain 
and undermine effective national economic governance, including the industrial 
policy initiatives that have been behind high growth in the East Asian region. Three 
aspects of international economic liberalization have been important in East Asia 
since the 1980s, and are likely to have some bearing on social development in the 
region: international trade, investment regimes and financial governance. The period 
since the 1980s has seen the emergence of new instruments of neo-liberal economic 
restructuring at the global level besides the Bretton Woods institutions. 
                                                
7  Chang (2000) rejects the argument that East Asia was economically successful because 
it was a social policy-free zone. He contends that it was only because of a range of social 
policiessome more implicit (e.g. land reform, corporate welfare, and the institution of life 
time employment for some) than othersthat the East Asian countries managed to achieve 
social peace and economic prosperity.  He further argues that while it may be possible to 
increase the efficiency of the East Asian economies by abolishing some of these provisions, 
but this is likely to increase social tensions and may ultimately damage their prosperity. This 
is not to deny the need for social policy reform, however, as many of these countries still have 
a long way to go before they can claim to have established genuinely inclusive and cohesive 
societies. 
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3.1. GATT, the Uruguay Round and WTO 
Conclusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) gave birth to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
WTO has quickly emerged as the new arena for such new economic governance 
initiatives, not only involving the international trade of goods, but other related 
matters as well. On 6 September 1994, all members of GATT ratified the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to replace the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1 January 1995. 
 
The establishment of the WTO has significantly advanced economic liberalization. 
This has not only involved the international trade in goods, but has also been 
extended to cover services (through GATS, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services) as well as investment (through the agreement on TRIMs, or trade-related 
investment measures). With the further strengthening of transnational-dominated 
intellectual property rights through the agreement on TRIPS (trade-related intellectual 
property rights), technology acquisition is going to become more difficult and costly, 
further constraining national industrial and technology policies. Not surprisingly, many 
governments in developing countries suspect that the proposed labour standards and 
environmental clauses are also intended to further constrain the possibilities for late 
industrialization. 
 
The WTO is committed to facilitating the effective implementation of the substantive 
rules that have been negotiated in the Uruguay Round and since. While continuing 
many GATT ideas and practices for trade liberalization, the new structure has 
eliminated some old GATT features protecting developing country interests under the 
guise of leveling the playing field. These include some important changes for more 
forceful implementation of the Uruguay Round. The WTO has also extended its 
jurisdiction to new matters negotiated in the Uruguay Round, particularly services 
and intellectual property. Since GATT only applied to goods, the WTO Charter offers 
considerably better opportunities for the future evolution and development of the 
institutional structure for international economic governance. Its structure is 
complemented by an effective enforcement mechanism to establish an international 
economic order ensuring greater freedom for transnational corporations, and under 
which, intervention by governments, particularly of the South, will be progressively 
minimized. 
 
In the WTO, one country has one voteunlike in the IMF and the World Bank where 
one dollar carried one vote, crudely speaking. But since the WTO depends on the G-
7 countries for the bulk of its finances, and since these countries dominate world 
trade, accounting for two-thirds of such trade, this nominal democracy seems to be 
less significant in reality. In addition, countries of the South seem to have lost much 
of their limited capacity for cooperation and coordination in international forums, 
which was much more evident in the 1970s. The heterogeneity of interests among 
countries of the South has also become much more significant in undermining the 
capacity for effective collective action. 
 
The WTO has proved to be far more powerful than the GATT in supervising the new 
international economic order, covering trade in manufactures, agriculture, services, 
and intellectual property, as well as investment regulation. The WTO has an 
integrated dispute settlement system, which effectively means that if a country does 
not fulfil its obligations in one area (say, enforcing intellectual property rights), 
sanctions can be applied against it in another area that hurts it most (for example, its 
exports of primary products). The WTO has also been coordinating its programs and 
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policies with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, resulting in cross-
institutional conditionality. 
 
As noted above, the WTO is hardly a community of equal nations in practice.  It has 
been more likely to discipline governments based on guidelines set by the major 
economic powers, but seems less likely to enforce rules when its most powerful 
members flout them. Thus, the United States and Europe can and have used the 
WTO to further their own interests. Meanwhile, the G-7 has been drafting policies to 
direct the WTO in ways favourable to them, as in the United Nations and other 
international bodies in recent years. Some powers still use unilateral measures to 
resolve bilateral trade disputes, e.g., the US used its Super 301 law against Japan in 
February 1994 after conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993. The US 
also delayed acceptance of the application of Chinawhich had quit GATT after the 
1949 communist takeoverto join the WTO, exacting heavy concessions from the 
People's Republic as the cost of accession. 
 
Washington has frequently threatened punitive tariffs on imports from China on the 
grounds that Beijing has not done enough to curb widespread piracy of US 
copyrights, trademarks and patents. Such actions clearly threaten the multilateral 
spirit of the Uruguay Round agreement, but neither GATT nor the WTO has 
condemned the US actions. Hence the WTO as an instrument of the emerging global 
economic governance is not only a threat to developing countries sovereignty, but 
also adversely affects prospects for late industrialization and development in the 
South, as others try to emulate East Asia. 
 
In addition to tightening rules on dispute settlement and anti-dumping regulations, 
clarifying subsidies, and introducing new safeguard measures, new agreements were 
also concluded enhancing market access in East Asia. First, developed countries 
agreed to lower average tariff rates on industrial products by about 40 percent. 
Second, the contracting parties agreed to replace various border taxes on agricultural 
products with tariffs (tariffication), to lower tariffs, and to reduce domestic and export 
subsidies. Third, the contracting parties agreed to integrate the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) into the WTO in ten years. 
 
The establishment of the WTO has also created a powerful permanent forum and 
agency for continued trade-related global economic liberalization, with far more 
onerous new terms and conditions accompanying the emerging new governance 
structure as well as greater means for enforcing them. The WTO regime will force the 
economies of developing countries to be more open to industrial countries for trade, 
capital, investment and technology. Countries will be obliged to agree to greater 
foreign firm domination with the new intellectual property, services and trade-related 
investment rules. They also face tougher regulations (e.g., national rules-of-origin 
requirements to avoid charges of dumping) and punitive measures. In general, the 
sovereignty of developing country governments has been greatly eroded. Developing 
countries stand to lose preferential treatment from industrial nations under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Such treatment will be gradually 
removed, or will be tied to new obligations involving TRIMS, TRIPS, greater foreign 
access to the services sector, and perhaps even labour and environmental 
standards. 
 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, it is also very difficult to use non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) as disguised forms of protection. Besides tariffication, tariff levels 
are being forced down, especially in the South. However, tariff escalationinvolving 
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higher duties for more processed productsis still evident in major developed 
countries, such as the European Union and Japan, even in post-Uruguay Round tariff 
regimes, thus effectively discouraging developing countries from downstream 
processing and export of processed products instead of primary commodities. In the 
immediate future, powerful companies in the North seeking protection will attempt to 
make far greater use of anti-dumping laws and the like. Such protection has 
increased significantly in recent years and the trend is likely to accelerate. For 
example, it is becoming increasingly difficult to use government procurement 
procedures and practices to favour national suppliers. 
 
Meanwhile, governments and firms in the North have been busily inventing new 
measures. The lowering of NTMs and tariff levels will bring in more imports and 
increase market access for foreign goods. Tougher competition between domestic 
and foreign producers should emerge, possibly improving consumer welfare in the 
short term, but also undermining the expansion of indigenous industrial capacity in 
developing countries. The economies of developing countries will also be more 
susceptible to external shocks, which will adversely affect their economic stability. 
While exports will be further enhanced, payments for imports will also increase. 
 
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) has placed quotas on Third World exports of 
textiles and clothing to the North since 1974 to enable industrial countries to adjust to 
the competitiveness of Third World imports. However, the MFA has also provided a 
window of opportunity for developing countries beginning industrialization. With the 
Uruguay Round accord, the MFA will be phased out by 2006 to be replaced by a new 
system of (yet unknown) temporary selective safeguards that are likely to be less 
conducive to late industrialization than the MFA it will replace. As for market access 
more generally, the European Union has begun discussing plans to achieve global 
tariff-free trade by 2020, and is pushing for a new round of trade talks by 1999. 
 
There is also little evidence of the terms of trade improving for the South in general, 
and East Asia in particular. If anything, long-term trends suggest that the converse 
has been true. Indeed, Table 3 shows Malaysia, and especially Indonesia, facing 
diminishing terms of trade between 1985 and 1995, despite significant increases in 
the ratio of exports to GDP and the ratio of manufactures to total exports. In this light, 
three broad observations are salient. First, there has been a secular decline in the 
terms of trade for primary commodities continuing into the 1980s and 1990s. Second, 
there seems to have been a relative decline in the prices of manufactured exports 
from the South compared to manufactured imports into the South, especially from the 
North. Third, trade liberalization in the South has grown, mainly from the mid-1980s. 
The trends have been so worrying that enhanced productivity and competitiveness in 
East Asia may well have contributed to a variant of immiserizing growth, i.e., of 
productivity gains that are less-than-proportionately reflected in rising real incomes or 
living standards. 
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Table 3. Four High-Performing Asian Economies: Trade Trends, 1970-1995 (per cent) 
 
Economy Exports as per cent of GDP Manufactures as 
 per cent of All Exports
Net Barter 
Terms of Trade 
 1970 1980 1995 1980 1993 1985 1995 
South Korea 14 34 33 90 93 94 102 
Malaysia 42 58 96 19 65 114 92 
Thailand 15 24 42 28 73 103 100 
Indonesia 13 33 25 2 53 145 79 
Source: World Bank (1994, 1995, 1997). 
 
The establishment of the WTO in place of the GATT has been justified as ultimately 
being in the best interests of all. More generally, such developments are said to be 
part and parcel of global economic liberalization, which is said to be in the interests of 
developing economies. The Asian Development Bank (1997) has claimed that 
openness has been good for economic development. Such arguments often cite East 
Asia as providing supportive evidence of this claim. However, more careful 
examination of export-oriented and export-led growth in East Asia, as was outlined 
above, suggests otherwise. In Northeast Asia, as we have seen, the regimes 
successfully encouraged export-oriented industrialization from the 1960s while 
continuing to protect domestic markets. By providing temporary effective protection 
conditional on appropriately phased export promotion, these regimes ensured that 
their infant industries quickly became internationally competitive. 
 
East Asian economies have clearly experienced substantial trade liberalization since 
the mid-1980s. Foreign trade-to-GDP ratios have risen in most East Asian countries 
(except for South Korea), with imports and exports continuing to grow rapidly, as 
shown in Table 4. Such trends have mainly been due to pressures imposed by the 
United States and the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), greater competition, and the requirements of international 
acceptability. International developments following the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations have introduced new constraints and challenges, but 
also offered new opportunities for East Asian economies. 
 
While still extensively pursuing interventionist policies, all five economies have 
selectively undergone considerable liberalization since the 1980s. In examining the 
effects of economic liberalization in the region, the main developments in 
international trade to consider have been those associated with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Other regional trade arrangements such as the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
have been and are being transformed into WTO-consistent institutions working to 
liberalize trade. The consequences of such liberalization are uneven, with some 
economies, industries and firms better placed to make gains from further 
liberalization and to minimize their potentially harmful effects, while others are much 
more vulnerable. 
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Table 4. Five High-Performing Asian Economies: Trade Growth and GDP Share, 
1970-1995 (per cent) 
 
Economy Average Annual 
Import Growth 
Average Annual 
Export Growth 
Total Trade/ 
GDP 
 1970-80 1980-92 1970-80 1980-90 1990-95 1980 1995 
South Korea 11.6 11.2 23.5 12.0 13.4 74 67 
Taiwan (PoC) 12.2 10.6 15.6 11.0 na na na 
Malaysia 3.7 7.9 4.8 10.9 14.4 113 194 
Thailand 5.0 11.5 10.3 14.0 14.2 54 90 
Indonesia 13.0 4.0 7.2 2.9 10.8 53 53 
Note: na - not available. 
Source: World Bank (1994, 1995, 1997). 
 
The industrial structures, capacities and capabilities in South Korea and Taiwan have 
generally been mature enough to allow further trade liberalization. Neither tariffs nor 
subsidies are essential any longer for them to continue to try to catch up 
technologically in memory chips, computers, televisions and steel. In South Korea, 
the same is true for ships and automobiles, and in Taiwan, for machine tools. Both 
economies have deregulated so much that they are now among the more open 
economies by international standards. South Korea and Taiwan, with firms at the 
technology frontiers in several industries, have been ready to undergo trade 
liberalization without seriously fettering their growth. On the other hand, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia have very few domestic firms at any technology frontiers, 
while foreign firms in these countries seem unlikely to significantly develop linkages 
with the rest of the host economies. The recently attempted promotion of high 
technology industries will be difficult to sustain with further liberalization, while 
industries trying to catch up technologically are likely to suffer. 
 
To the extent that trade liberalization has been voluntary, policy changes have often 
reflected the success of previous industrial policy in developing internationally 
competitive national industrial capacities, rendering further protection and support no 
longer necessary, let alone desirable. Hence, insofar as selective industrial policy 
has involved time-bound disciplinary mechanismssuch as temporary effective 
protection while developing internationally competitive industrial capacitythe 
efficacy of such mechanisms involves gradually subjecting the industries or firms 
concerned to international market exposure through trade liberalization. 
 
When trade liberalization has been forced upon governments, it has often 
undermined the option of using trade policy instruments, though some would argue 
that the opponents of trade liberalization have sometimes exaggerated their 
consequences. Needless to say, this will have adverse consequences for those 
economies just beginning to embark on late industrialization efforts. However, insofar 
as trade restrictions have not been part of feasible programs to accelerate national 
industrial capacity development, externally coerced trade liberalization would have 
positive welfare implications in both the short as well as the medium term. 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) initiative contained provisions 
ensuring most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment for all signatories (the same 
treatment to be given to all member countries), national treatment (no discrimination 
against services of other countries) and abolition of restrictions on market access (no 
adoption of measures such as those restricting the number of service suppliers). 
Agreements were also concluded on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
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and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS); e.g., local content (LC) 
requirementsspecifying that enterprises must procure a certain percentage of their 
component parts locallyare now prohibited. These new rules seriously reduce the 
room for industrial policy initiatives although they do not eliminate them altogether. At 
the end of 1997, a financial services agreement established the basis for more rapid 
international financial liberalization. 
 
Conclusions 
The last few decades have seen growing international economic integration. 
Globalization and its implications have been quite complex, often uneven, and even 
contradictory. Since the 1980s, it has been associated with the emergence of a new 
transnational regime characterized by weaker national state sovereignty. But 
international economic integration is not the same as globalization. Regionalization 
has been as important a force for international economic integration, and arguably 
more important for some kinds of cross-border economic relations. There are also 
many dimensions of international economic relations, which tend to be conflated in 
words such as globalization. 
 
This paper has tried to identify the factors that have contributed to the rapid growth of 
export-oriented employment for women in East Asia.  It has argued that rapid 
industrialization and growth in the region has been largely due to appropriate state 
interventions.  Infant industries in Northeast Asia were provided with effective 
protection conditional on export promotion, which can hardly be equated with trade 
liberalization. The early growth of female employment in export-oriented 
manufacturing has to be seen as the consequence of particular policies pursued by 
the governments concerned.  The successful late industrialization of East Asia due 
to industrial policy interventions has posed awkward challenges for the current neo-
liberal orthodoxy associated with the so-called Washington Consensus. 
 
But the paper also acknowledges that the East Asian regions experiences have 
been varied.  For many of the differences, the divide has been between Northeast 
and Southeast Asia, but it would be erroneous to see the latter as simply following in 
the footsteps of the former, as suggested by the imagery of flying geese. Southeast 
Asia pursued greater trade liberalization earlier than in Northeast Asia, and has also 
depended far more on foreign direct investment (FDI). The role of industrial policy 
has also been more modest and problematic in more market-friendly Southeast 
Asia. Consequently, the region has less industrial capacity and capabilities. 
 
Yet, even in Southeast Asia, export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing by 
foreign investors did not develop spontaneously due to the availability of cheap 
labour, free trade and the absence of capital controls. While indigenous firms led 
industrialization in Northeast Asia, foreign direct investment has been far more 
important in Southeast Asia. In the latter, export-oriented industrialization has seen a 
much larger role for export-processing zones and related incentives. Hence, 
successful export-oriented industrialization in East Asia did not occur spontaneously 
in open economies, but had to be induced with appropriate policies, institutions and 
incentives in the form of development strategies. 
 
Not surprisingly, the early phases of labour-intensive industrialization were more 
concerned with wage costs. Recruiting cheaper and more productive women 
probably facilitated capital accumulation and accelerated growth in the region. 
Throughout the region, late industrialization often began with labour intensive 
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manufacturinggarments and apparel as well as electrical and electronic industries. 
It seems that as manufacturing production has matured and diversified in the first-tier 
East Asian newly industrialized economies, the share of females in manufacturing 
employment has gone down. 
 
Hence, the evidence points to rapid growth of female employment as industrialization 
acceleratedat different timesin the region. The numbers of women in 
manufacturing employment were often almost at par withif not in excess ofmen 
at some point before falling behind. However, there is no clear relationship between 
the timing of the peak in the female share of manufacturing employment and the 
maturity of industrialization or the achievement of near full employment.  In the first 
generation East Asian newly industrialized economies considered here, the turning 
point was at different points in the eighties.  It is likely that Malaysia reached this 
point in the early nineties, while Thailand and Indonesia may have reached their 
apexes in the late nineties. 
 
Rapid economic growth and strengthened currencies encouraged many firms in 
Japan and the first generation NIEs to relocate manufacturing to lower wage cost 
sites in China and Southeast Asia, which in turn accelerated industrialization in 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia from the late 1980s. Seguino (2000) suggests that 
the increase in outward FDI reduced the gender wage gap in South Korea while 
increasing it in Taiwan, which she partly attributes to more pervasive state 
interventions in the former. However, despite the more significant role of the state in 
Singapores industrialization compared to Hong Kongs, the converse seems to have 
been true in the two municipal economies. Except for the achievement of near full 
employment in Malaysia and Thailand in the nineties, there is little other evidence of 
women workers bargaining power increasing though the wage gap seems to have 
been closing.  
 
The female share of manufacturing employment appears to have dropped off in East 
Asia with the deceleration of industrialization and manufacturing export growth, 
though existing evidence does not allow a more careful and detailed examination of 
the processes at work.  There is considerable evidence that the gender gap in 
wages, as well as the degree of gendered occupational segregation, remain large by 
international standards in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, and has 
shown little sign of amelioration over time.  It seems likely that cultural prejudice, 
including gender preferences, as well as legal and normative requirements have 
served to perpetuate such differences over time.  However, while manufacturing 
employment growth for women has fallen off, service employment opportunities have 
grown with structural change, with mixed consequences for women. 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions have discouraged East Asian governments from 
developing Western-style welfare institutions. Instead, in response to the 1997-8 
regional crises, they have favoured social safety nets to deal with crisis situations.  
Ironically, the approach requires governments to develop and improve their selection 
capabilities in order to be effective during crises.  The recent failures of the social 
safety net approach in the crisis-hit Southeast Asian economies underscore the need 
for governments to develop such capabilities before crisis hits. Acceptance of the 
principle of selectivity is also important for other selective government interventions 
such as industrial policy usually opposed by these institutions. Developing a 
capability to provide social safety nets is consistent with the desirability of counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies. 
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Economic liberalization and globalization are likely to make it almost impossible for a 
new generation of late industrializers to emulate Japan and the East Asian newly 
industrialized economies with the possible exception of economies such as China 
and India which have resisted full-scale liberalization and globalization to try to 
develop national industrial capacities and capabilities. Their successful emergence 
will make it much more difficult for other developing countries to accelerate their 
development processes.  
 
Hence, with some exceptions, which will only serve to prove the rule, it is not likely 
that many more countries will be able to develop mature industrial economies in the 
foreseeable future.  However, it is more likely that such countries may experience 
industrial spurts as some of them successfully create the conditions to attract 
industrial investors to relocate there to take advantage of temporary advantages 
enhanced by investment incentives and other institutional and policy attractions. 
Such spurts of export-oriented manufacturing employment growth may well create 
employment opportunities for women, either directly or indirectly, with rather mixed 
consequences for their condition, judging by the East Asian experiences. However, 
the sustainability of such employment growth is more doubtful as accelerated 
liberalization and globalization seem to be creating the conditions for immiserizing 
growth with constant downward pressure on manufacturing wages determined by 
global labour cost competitiveness. 
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